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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960234-CA 
vs. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, : Priority No. 10 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from sentencing on a plea in abeyance for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-5-103, in the First Judicial District Court in 
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. 
Hadfield, presiding. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was the imposition of the conditions imposed in this case 
a final order? 
2. Did the trial court err in imposing the conditions of an 
indeterminate jail term up to one year, and a fine, on a plea in 
abeyance, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-2a-l et. 
seq (1953 as amended)? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's legal conclusions will be 
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reversed only if shown to be clearly erroneous. State v. Deli. 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
A trial courtfs interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness, with no deference accorded to 
the trial court's legal conclusions arising from its 
interpretation. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The Appellant identifies the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules as those "whose 
interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a) (6) : 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-2a-l et. seq.: 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, 
upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant, 
accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering 
judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with 
specific conditions as set forth in a plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement 
entered into between the prosecution and the 
defendant setting forth the specific terms and 
conditions upon which, following acceptance of the 
agreement by the court, a plea may be held in 
abeyance. 
77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement -- Negotiation --
Contents -- Terms of agreement -- Waiver of time for 
sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of 
guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment 
of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court 
may, upon motion of both the prosecuting attorney 
and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and 
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not enter judgment of conviction against the 
defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant 
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel 
during negotiations for a plea in abeyance and at 
the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any 
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant 
shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented 
by counsel at any court hearing relating to a plea 
in abeyance agreement. 
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into 
between the prosecution and the defendant and 
approved by the court shall include a full, 
detailed recitation of the requirements and 
conditions agreed to by the defendant and the 
reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in 
abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any 
combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the 
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to 
acceptance by the court, be executed by the 
prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the 
defendant' s counsel in the presence of the court. 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a 
period longer than 18 months if the plea was to any 
class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if 
the plea was to any degree of felony or to any 
combination of misdemeanors and felonies. 
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be 
approved unless the defendant, before the court, 
and any written agreement, knowingly and 
intelligently waives time for sentencing as 
designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Manner of entry of plea -- Powers of court. 
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a 
plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in full 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that 
the court may, upon finding that the defendant has 
successfully completed the terms of the agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter 
judgment of conviction and impose sentence for 
a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant' s plea and 
order the dismissal of the case. 
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(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully 
completed the terms of a plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the 
offense, dismiss the case only as provided in the 
plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all 
parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any 
lesser offense pursuant to plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court may not invoke Section 76-3-
402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of 
Corrections to assist in the administration of the 
plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were 
on probation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in 
abeyance agreement and pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable 
plea in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated 
in the same manner as if it had been paid as a 
fine and shall not exceed in amount the 
maximum fine which could have been imposed 
upon conviction and sentencing for the same 
offense; 
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a 
portion of the costs of administration of the 
agreement; 
(c) order the defendant to pay full 
restitution to the victims of his actions as 
provided in Section 76-3-201; 
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of 
any rehabilitative program required by the 
terms of the agreement; and 
(e) order the defendant to comply with any 
other conditions which could have been imposed 
as conditions of probation upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without 
the consent of both the prosecuting attorney and 
the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting 
attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not 
subject to judicial review. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case 
involving a sexual offense against a victim who is 
under the age of 14. 
Violation of plea in abeyance agreement -- Hearing 
-- Entry of judgment and imposition of sentence --
Subsequent prosecutions. 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in 
abeyance agreement, information comes to the 
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court 
k 
that the defendant has violated any condition of 
the agreement, the court, at the request of the 
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion 
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an 
order requiring the defendant to appear before the 
court at a designated time and place to show cause 
why the court should not find the terms of the 
agreement to have been violated and why the 
agreement should not be terminated. If, following 
an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with 
any term or condition of the plea in abeyance 
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter 
judgment of conviction and impose sentence against 
the defendant for the offense to which the original 
plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts 
paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee 
prior to termination of the agreement shall be 
credit against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement 
and subsequent entry of judgment of conviction and 
imposition of sentence shall not bar any 
independent prosecution arising from any offense 
that constituted a violation of any term or 
condition of an agreement whereby the original plea 
was placed in abeyance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An information was filed on 12 December 1995, charging 
defendant with aggravated assault. On 29 January 1996, defendant 
entered into a plea in abeyance agreement, pleading guilty to the 
charge. On 26 February 1996, defendant was sentenced, or, as the 
State would characterize it, "further conditions were imposed." 
Two of those conditions were: 1) a fine and surcharge in the amount 
of $925.00; and 2) an indeterminate term of imprisonment up to one 
year. 
On or about 21 March 1996, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. 
On 17 April 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition. Both the defendant and the State 
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responded by memorandum to the motion, and on 11 June 1996, the 
Court denied the motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about 6 December 1995, the defendant appeared at the 
victim1 s residence in an intoxicated state. He apparently knocked 
on the door of the residence and a woman answered. Defendant 
indicated that he thought he had left some knives that belonged to 
him at the residence. A single knife was produced and given to 
defendant, but he indicated that he thought there were more knives. 
Defendant then opened the blade of the knife he had and made some 
threatening comments to the woman, though he did not touch or harm 
the woman. (Change of Plea Hearing, 29 January 1996, p. 6).x 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court has jurisdiction in this case because there was a 
signed order and it was final. The trial judge signed a Judgment 
and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance. This order incorporated the 
terms later imposed by the trial court. The order was final 
because the particular proceeding was terminated by the trial 
court's judgment, the ruling specified with certainty a final 
determination of the rights of the parties, and the ruling was 
susceptible of enforcement. 
The "conditions imposed" in this case were tantamount to 
sentencing, as the trial court imposed a fine and incarceration, 
neither of which is allowed under the plea in abeyance statute 
1
 This transcript was not paginated as part of the record. 
Hence, the citation differs from the others. 
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because they constitute sentencing. The trial court's position was 
that if the defendant only got the benefit of no judgment of 
conviction, that is sufficient. The legislature, however, intended 
defendants to have two benefits under a plea in abeyance agreement: 
1) no judgment of conviction, and 2) no imposition of sentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS FINAL 
A. THERE IS A SIGNED ORDER. 
The trial judge signed a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in 
Abeyance. (R. at 29). The State concedes as much. (See State's 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Dismissal, at 2: 
"Since filing its memorandum on 24 April 1996, the State has 
learned that a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance was 
entered in this case on 27 February 1996.") While that order did 
not, in the document itself, state the terms of the conditions 
imposed, paragraph 8 incorporated the terms the trial court 
imposed, as the State has also conceded. Id. 
The State contends, however, that the order is not final 
because the defendant was not sentenced. Articulating the issue in 
this manner, for this Court to determine whether or not the order 
was final it must determine whether or not defendant was sentenced. 
In other words, this Court must determine the substantive issue in 
order to decide the procedural question of whether or not it has 
jurisdiction, as circular as that may seem. 
7 
B. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS FINAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated long ago: "Of course, if this 
court determines that a judgment is final, it is, as far as the 
right of appeal is concerned, final, whether final or not." 
Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 73 p.2d 1277, 1288 (Utah 1937)(Cited 
in footnote of Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, n. 1 (Utah 1984).2 
The Court in Pomeroy further stated: 
The test of finality for the purpose of 
appeal, therefore, is not necessarily whether 
the whole matter involved in the action is 
concluded, but whether the particular 
proceeding or action is terminated by the 
judgment. 
Pomeroy at 1290. (Italics original). The State may contend that 
the order on the plea in abeyance did not conclude the "whole 
matter involved," and is therefore not "final". In other words, if 
the defendant failed to abide by the conditions of the plea in 
abeyance, judgment would be entered and the defendant could be 
sentenced to prison. The State's position is most likely that, at 
that point, the "whole matter involved" would be concluded, and 
therefore "final". As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, however, 
the whole matter need not be concluded for there to be a final 
j udgment. 
2
 That footnote states: "[a]1though not designated an 
"order1 or "Judgment,! the ruling specifies with certainty a 
final determination of the rights of the parties and is 
susceptible of enforcement. Further, it orders the issuance of a 
writ and is clear as to the party against whom it is issued. We 
therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal, it being from a 
final judgment or order." See also Ellinwood v. Bennion, 276 P. 
159, 160 (Utah 1929) . 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
that in appropriate circumstances, [even] a signed minute 
entry may be a final order for purposes of appeal. 
However, such treatment is appropriate only when "the 
ruling specifies with certainty a final determination of 
the rights of the parties and is susceptible of 
enforcement.! 
Swenson v. State, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994)(emphasis 
original) (citations omitted) . What we have here is much more 
substantial than a minute entry--it is a signed order. The issue 
in this case revolves around several considerations: 1) whether the 
particular proceeding was terminated by the trial court's judgment; 
2) whether the ruling specifies with certainty a final 
determination of the rights of the parties; and 3) whether the 
ruling is susceptible of enforcement. See Cannon v. Keller, supra. 
1. THE PARTICULAR PROCEEDING WAS TERMINATED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The "particular proceeding" here was the imposition of 
conditions under the plea in abeyance agreement. A hearing was 
held on 26 February 1996 at which conditions were imposed upon the 
defendant pursuant to the plea in abeyance agreement (though the 
defendant asserts that the proceedings would be more accurately 
characterized as "sentencing.") No further hearings were scheduled 
or pending to impose conditions under the agreement. While it!s 
true that if the defendant fails to abide by the conditions of the 
plea in abeyance agreement there would be further proceedings to 
enter judgment and impose sentence, the defendant's position is 
that those proceedings would not be pursuant to the plea in 
abeyance agreement (as it would be terminated pursuant to Section 
1 
77-2a-4(l) U.C.A.), but rather pursuant to his guilty plea. In 
other words, those proceedings would be separate, and not a part of 
the "particular proceeding" which dealt with "imposing conditions" 
upon the defendant. At the time the trial judge signed the order 
on the plea held in abeyance, the "particular proceeding" at issue 
was terminated. 
2 . THE RULING SPECIFIED WITH CERTAINTY A FINAL DETERMINATION 
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES. 
The trial court's ruling in this matter specified with 
certainty a final determination concerning the defendant's right to 
remain free from incarceration under the plea in abeyance 
agreement. There can be no question that the defendant was 
sentenced to spend additional time incarcerated. The State argued 
in its Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Dismissal that 
the jail time was "diluted" because it allowed defendant to get out 
of jail as soon as he was accepted into a program. This argument 
admits, however, that jail time was imposed, however "diluted" it 
may be. Notwithstanding, the plea in abeyance statute doesn't 
allow for even "diluted" jail time to be imposed. 
Under the circumstances, the defendant spent more time in jail 
after the conclusion of the hearing of 26 February 1996. It is 
unreasonable to believe that the defendant could contact an 
inpatient treatment program, get accepted, and arrange 
transportation to the facility on the same day as his sentencing. 
The only conclusion to be drawn is that the defendant spent more 
time incarcerated before entering a treatment program. (Moreover, 
there was no evidence that the defendant would in fact be accepted 
into an inpatient treatment program, and no evidence that he could 
afford one.) 
The court's ruling also specified with certainty a final 
determination of other rights. For example, the defendant was 
sentenced to pay a fine and surcharge in the amount of $925.00. 
The fine was not suspended (as is sometimes the case); defendant 
was ordered to pay it. At that point, he no longer had a right to 
be free from paying the fine imposed, which is precluded under 
Section 77-2a-3(5)(a). 
The defendant was also ordered to do the following: 
1. enter into inpatient treatment 
2. take Antabuse 
3. attend AA meetings at least once a week 
4. not possess or consume alcohol or drugs 
5. not frequent any place where alcohol is the main item on 
the menu 
6. submit to random testing of his bodily fluids and/or 
breath 
7. submit to random search and seizure of his personal 
property by any law enforcement officer 
8. obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable employment 
9. enter into a standard probation agreement. 
These all affected defendant's rights. 
3. THE RULING WAS SUSCEPTIBLE OF ENFORCEMENT. 
At the time of sentencing defendant had already spent 82 days 
in jail. (R. at 46 line 2). The court ordered defendant to serve 
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up to one year in jail, and ordered that he be allowed to enter 
into an inpatient treatment program as soon as he was accepted. 
The defendant obviously spent more time in jail until he was 
accepted into a treatment program (if, in fact, that ever 
occurred). As argued above, it is unreasonable to believe that 
defendant could have contacted an inpatient treatment program on 
the day of sentencing, got accepted and transported to that 
facility on the same day. The only logical conclusion is that 
defendant spent more time in jail before going to a treatment 
program. The only way for the trial court to avoid violating the 
plea in abeyance statute would have been to order the defendant' s 
release from custody pending his acceptance and entry into an 
inpatient treatment program. 
Based on the above considerations, at the time the trial court 
sentenced (or "imposed the conditions on") the defendant, and those 
conditions were enforced, the matter became final in the most 
literal sense of the word, especially regarding the imposition of 
additional jail time--once defendant spent any time in jail, the 
clock could not be turned back and those actions undone: they were 
final. 
C. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
WAS NOT FINAL, THEN THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL. 
This is a very unique case which the interests of justice 
demand be reviewed by this Court. If this Court determines that 
the order was not final, the defendant does not have the option of 
then filing a petition for permission to file an interlocutory 
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appeal because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 20 days 
after entry of judgment, as required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Subsection (e) of that rule states that: 
An appeal from an interlocutory order may be granted only if 
it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination 
of the correctness of the order before final judgment will 
better serve the administration and interests of justice. 
(Emphasis added). The interests of justice will not be served if 
this Court does not take the opportunity to rule on the correctness 
of the trial court's order. 
POINT II 
THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED IN THIS CASE 
WERE TANTAMOUNT TO SENTENCING, IN 
VIOLATION OP THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE 
Because resolution of the issues in this case depends on how 
the plea in abeyance statute is interpreted, some guidance will be 
helpful. This Court has stated that when interpreting part of a 
statute, it should be construed in light of the purpose of the 
statute as a whole. State v. Scieszka. 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 
App. 1995). The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "When faced with 
a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain 
language of the statute." Carlie v. Morgan. 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 
23 (Utah June 25, 1996) (citations omitted) . The courts have a 
"fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the 
statute." Isi. at 24 (Citation omitted) (Emphasis added) . In State 
v. One 1984 Qldsmobile. 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah March 24, 
1995), the Utah Supreme Court stated that in interpreting a 
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particular statute, 
we first look to the plain language of the statute. In 
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are 
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." 
(Citations omitted). We are further instructed that if the 
legislature's intent of any particular portion of a statute is not 
readily apparent, those portions should be read in the context of 
the statute as a whole. Carlie v. Morgan, 293 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
24. Therefore, section 77-2a-3 (5) (e) should be read in the 
context of the plea in abeyance statute as a whole. 
The easiest way to understand the intent of the plea in 
abeyance statute as a whole is to read the "Definitions" section, 
which articulates the purpose of the statute. It reads as follows: 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, 
upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant, 
accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering 
judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with 
specific conditions as set forth in a plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(Emphasis added). Clearly there is to be no sentence imposed. 
This language appears to be plain on its face. To understand what 
the legislature intended the word "sentence" to mean, we need only 
read the statute further. Specifically, we111 focus on whether 
under this statute a fine and incarceration constitute a sentence. 
A. A FINE CONSTITUTES A "SENTENCE." 
The question of whether a fine constitutes a "sentence" can 
easily be answered by reading Section 77-2a-3(5)(a). 
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(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance 
agreement and pursuant to the terms of the agreement: 
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea 
in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated in the 
same manner as if it had been paid as a fine and 
shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which 
could have been imposed upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense; 
(Emphasis added). The wording of this subsection plainly shows 
that a fine cannot be imposed under a plea in abeyance agreement, 
but could be if a defendant were convicted and sentenced. The 
intent of the legislature is that, under this statute, a fine 
constitutes a "sentence." 
B. THE IMPOSITION OF JAIL TIME CONSTITUTES A "SENTENCE." 
The question of whether the imposition of jail time 
constitutes a sentence is also easily answered. Section 77-2a-3(5) 
and its subparts enumerate what trial courts may do under a plea in 
abeyance agreement. Nowhere is there any indication that the 
imposition of jail time is allowable under the statute, at least 
nowhere outside of the ambiguous subsection (5) (e) . It is not 
reasonable to accept the notion that imposing a fine constitutes a 
"sentence", while imposing jail time does not. Of the two 
"conditions," certainly jail time is the harsher, and it is 
unreasonable to argue that the legislature intended for the courts 
to be allowed to impose jail time on a plea in abeyance. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Carlie v. Morgan, refused to read 
particular sections of the statute at issue in isolation from the 
rest of the statute. That should be done in this case, as well. 
Section 77-2a-3(5) (e) , when read alone, does indeed appear to give 
the trial courts power to impose any conditions. However, when 
15 
read in the context of the entire statute, section 77-2a-3(5)(e) 
cannot be interpreted to mean what the prosecution and trial court 
would have it mean. The Statefs and trial court!s reading of 
subsection (5)(e) render it unreasonably confused and inoperable. 
We must assume that the legislature used the term "sentence" 
advisedly and intended it to be understood literally. 
C. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 77-2a-3(5)(e) IS 
UNREASONABLE 
If, as the State contended below, a trial court can indeed 
"order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which 
could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction 
and sentencing for the same offense," then the phrase "nor impos [e] 
sentence upon him" is rendered absolutely meaningless. Indeed, it 
seems odd for the legislature to enumerate, in Section 77-2a-3(5) 
and its subparts, what the trial court can do, then throw in a 
clause that purports to give the trial court carte blanche to 
impose any conditions it wants to. Why enumerate any of the trial 
court's powers under a plea in abeyance if the court can in fact 
do anything it wants to? If the legislature truly intended for 
the trial courts1 powers to be so broad, it could and would have 
simply used subsection (e) of 77-2a-3(5) U.C.A. and foregone 
inclusion of the other enumerated powers. Indeed, one may ask why 
even have a statute governing pleas in abeyance if they're no 
different than any other case. 
lfi 
D. THE INTENT OF THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE IS THAT 
DEFENDANTS WHO ABIDE BY CONDITIONS IMPOSED OBTAIN 
TWO BENEFITS. 
Clearly the intent of the plea in abeyance statute is that a 
defendant who enters into a plea in abeyance agreement, and abides 
by the conditions imposed thereby, obtains two benefits: 1) no 
conviction, and 2) no sentencing. The trial court in this case 
apparently didn't understand it that way, as it expressed the 
opinion that a defendant who gets only the benefit of no conviction 
(but is sentenced) still has an incentive to enter into a plea in 
abeyance agreement. "When itfs all over he can come away with no 
record. There is still an obvious incentive or benefit." (R. at 
44 line 14-16). The prosecuting attorney agreed: 
As far as the plea in abeyance, itfs always 
been my feeling and position, Your Honor, that 
the key to that is the fact that the defendant 
in fact can go through the system, carry out 
what would be a probation and come away with 
no record. To me that is the benefit intended 
to be conferred by the legislature. I see no 
reason why this court cannot impose any 
restrictions it wants to impose as a condition 
of probation. 
(R. at 45 line 12-20). Anyone who takes an objective look at the 
plea in abeyance statute can see why the court cannot impose any 
restrictions it wants. The legislative intent of the statute is 
clear, and it is also clear that what the trial court did in this 
case is not in accord with that intent. In fact, it appears that 
the trial judge was not even aware that a statute governing plea in 
abeyance agreements exists. 
One would think that a trial judge would either be familiar 
with a statute governing a proceeding he's involved in, or at least 
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have the statute in front of him for reference, especially in a 
case in which the central issue has been disputed before with that 
particular judge. The trial judge in this case had obviously done 
neither. For example, at the sentencing hearing, the judge asked 
defense counsel for the statutory reference to the plea in abeyance 
statute (R. at 39 line 18) , despite the fact that the judge and 
defense counsel had "gone the rounds on the plea in abeyance issue 
before". (R. at 38 line 18-20). 
The trial judgefs lack of understanding of the applicable 
statute is evidenced further by other remarks in the proceedings 
below: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that I haven't made any 
agreement or any decision as to what sentence I would impose? 
(1/29/96 Plea Hearing at 8 line 15-17)(Emphasis added). 
• * * 
THE COURT: . . . The Court has received and reviewed a 
presentence investigation report. The defendant is before the 
court for sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea . . . . 
(R. at 37 line 4-7)(Emphasis added). 
• * * 
THE COURT: . . . If 11 require that he pay a fine and 
surcharge in the amount of $925. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Excuse me. Would that be more 
appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me -- well, that' s 
fine. 
THE COURT: Ifm not sure where you're going with that. 
(R. at 46 line 15-21) (Emphasis added) . 
• * * 
THE COURT: You will owe the fine. . . . 
(R. at 48 line 14)(Emphasis added). 
The trial court repeatedly referred to the proceeding as a 
1& 
"sentencing" and also imposed a "fine", which the statute does not 
allow. 
The statute makes it clear that a fine could only be imposed 
"upon conviction and sentencing" and not pursuant to a plea in 
abeyance agreement. As we see from Section 77-2a-l, there is to be 
neither conviction nor sentencing under a plea in abeyance; 
therefore, any fine imposed is in violation of this statute. 
CONCLUSION 
By assessing a fine and incarcerating the defendant, the trial 
court imposed sentence upon the him, despite the court carefully 
calling it "imposition of conditions" at the sentencing hearing. 
This is clearly a violation of the plea in abeyance statute, with 
which the trial court did not take the time to familiarize itself. 
The legislative intent of the plea in abeyance statute is that the 
defendant, if he abides by the conditions of the plea in abeyance, 
obtains two benefits: 1) no judgment of conviction, and 2) no 
sentence. Of this there can be no question. There can also be no 
question that, no matter what the trial court called it, the 
defendant was sentenced. 
Wherefore, defendant respectfully prays that this Court will 
remand his case so that conditions may be imposed appropriately 
under the plea in abeyance statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 2- day of October 1996. 
-"" MICHAELD. B0UWHUT5 
Attorney for Appellant 
12. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing via 
U.S. mail, with postage prepaid, to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, SLC UT 84114, this 
~7 day of October 1996. 
0,A. 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM A 
1/29 /96 P l e a H e a r i n g 
MR. HUNSAKER: Y e s , I d o . 
THE COURT: If you meet all of the terms that are 
required, then that won't happen. Is that also clear? 
MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied with 
the advice of counsel? 
MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you need any more time to confer 
with your attorney or to think about this? 
MR. HUNSAKER: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Have there been any promises made.. 
other than what has been stated here, to cause you to 
plead gui1ty ? 
MR. HUNSAKER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that I haven't made 
any agreement or any decision as to what sentence I 
would impos e ? 
MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, I understand that, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Has anyone used any force or duress 
or coercion to cause you to plead guilty? 
MR. HUNSAKER: No. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you 
a r e i n f a c t g u i l t y ? 
MR. HUNSAKER: No. 
1 ; THE CLERK: Case number 951000140, State of Utah 
2 i vs. Vao Boyd Hunsaker. 
3 : THE COURT: The record should reflect that the 
4 i defendant is present along with his counsel. The 
J 
5 j court has received and reviewed a presentence 
investigation report. The defendant is before the 
court for sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea to 
8 j aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
Mr. Bouwhuis, have you had an opportunity 
! 
10 | to review this report with your client? 
! 
11 | MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I've had the opportunity to 
i 
12: review it and I dropped a copy off at the jail on 
j 
13' Fridav to Mr. Hunsaker. He indicates he doesn't have 
14 
15 
any questions on the report. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hunsaker, if you want more time 
16 I I'll pass and go to another case and let you have an 
i 
17 i opportunity to visit with Mr. Bouwhuis. If you want 
i 
18 I to go ahead and proceed, we'll proceed now. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. HUNSAKER: Let's go ahead. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Isn't this a plea in abeyance 
with conditions? That's what our file seems to 
2 3 indi cate. 
24 
25 
MR. BOUWHUIS: It is 
THE COURT: Just a moment 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BUNDERSON: The report doesn't mention it, 
but in looking at the file the first thing I have in 
here is a motion, agreement and order for plea in 
abeyance. I assume that's what we're doing today. 
THE COURT: Based on the representations of 
counsel, this does appear to be a plea in abeyance 
agreement . I note for the record that the agreement 
apparently is in microfilming. It's not here in front 
of me . 
MR. BUNDERSON: For the court's benefit, it's 
just a standard agreement. The plea is to be held for 
a period of 36 months. The charge is to be dismissed 
at the end of 36 months. It was sent to AP&P for 
further conditions, if any. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bouwhuis, I'll hear 
from you at this time. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. The court 
is well aware, since we've kind of gone the rounds on 
the plea in abeyance issue before, on our position. 
Mr. Caine addressed that in the sentencing that was 
held just previously. I don't want to belabor the 
point too much, but for the record would point out 
that pleas in abeyance are governed by section 
77-2a-l. 
1 ; On a previous case I pointed out to the 
2 i court that I think it best, when this statute is 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, I" 
think at best the statute is ambiguous. When viewed 
in light -- well, from any perspective, it's 
ambiguous. 
Our position. Your Honor, is that the 
first subsection of 77-2a-l defines pleas in abeyance. 
It states that the court is to not enter a judgment of 
conviction nor impose sentence. Of course, the 
statute goes on to say in detail exactly what a plea 
12 j in abeyance entails. 77-2a-3 , sub five, does state 
i 
i 
13 j what the court can do. 
i 
14,' I think what the State would rely upon in 
15 ; asking the court to follow the recommendations, 
i 
16 ! specifically with reference to serving the jail time, 
17 j is subsection E. 
] 
18 | THE COURT: Can you give me that citation again? 
19 MR. BOUWHUIS: 77-2a-3, subsection five, sub E is 
2 0 i what I'm going to refer to. 
21 • THE COURT: Okay. 
i ! i 
22 j MR. BOUWHUIS: I believe that would be the 
i 
23 ; subsection that the State would rely on in urging the 
24 court to follow the recommendation for iail. The 
25 I court may order the defendant to comply with any other 
1 ! the c o u r t ? 
i 
MR. H U N S A K E R : I a p p r e c i a t e M r . B o u w h u i s b r i n g i n g 
that to l i g h t to the c o u r t , b e c a u s e w h e n I read the 
p r o v i s i o n s of the plea in a b e y a n c e , as he s a i d , it 
5 \ c^T.es in p r e t t y c l o s e to the top of the f i r s t 
i 
6 ! p a r a g r a p h or t w o . I like t h a t i d e a , that if I d i d n ' t 
7 j nu* s s up on my p r o b a t i o n I w o u l d n ' t be s e n t e n c e d as 
i 
S I ov.ilty u n l e s s I m e s s e d up on my p r o b a t i o n , is w h a t I 
3 j i n t e r p r e t e d it m y s e l f . 
| 
0 j THE C O U R T : A n y t h i n g from the S t a t e ? 
i 
1 j MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, we would concur with 
i 
^ j the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . As far as the p l e a in a b e y a n c e , 
i 
3 j it's a l w a y s b e e n my f e e l i n g and p o s i t i o n , Y o u r H o n o r , 
i 
4 \ that the key to that is the f a c t that the d e f e n d a n t in 
5 j f=ct can go t h r o u g h the s y s t e m , c a r r y out w h a t w o u l d 
6 \ ce a p r o b a t i o n and come away w i t h no r e c o r d . To me 
1 vS 
1 ^ 
2 4 
that is the b e n e f i t i n t e n d e d to be c o n f e r r e d by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . I see no r e a s o n w h y this c o u r t c a n n o t 
impose any r e s t r i c t i o n s it w a n t s to i m p o s e as a 
c c n d i t i o n of p r o b a t i o n . 
THE C O U R T : B a s e d u p o n the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n 
r e c e i v e d and the p l e a in a b e y a n c e a g r e e m e n t , the c o u r t 
will now i m p o s e the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s as a d d i t i o n a l 
c c n d i t i o n s for the plea in a b e y a n c e . 
N u m b e r o n e , I'll r e q u i r e that the 
1 • in such a way that jail time is not allowed 
2 ! I heard the court impose sentencing on 
3 i others, and particularly Mr. Gochis, who was sentenced 
4 just previous to this, although I would point out that 
5 there is a difference in the two cases. In the Gochis 
i 
6 ; case there would be a resulting class A conviction. 
I 
i i 
7 j In this case there will be no conviction if he 
8 | complies with the conditions. 
9 i THE COURT: Isn't that by itself reason for him 
10 I to do it, even if he served what would otherwise be 
11 j the same equivalent sentence? 
12 
13 ! 
MR. BOUWHUIS: To do the jail time? 
THE COURT: No. To enter into a plea in abeyance 
14 I agreement. When it's all over he can come away with 
i 
15 ; no record. There is still an obvious incentive or 
i 
16 \ bene fit. 
| 
17 | MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. My argument is 
j 
18 j that the legislature intended that the defendant come 
19 j away with two benefits. One is no sentence be imposed 
I 
20 and the second that there be no conviction. I a at 
21 
22 
23 ! 
that from the first paragraph under that statute that 
I've c i ted. 
I think I've made my argument. I'll 
24 • submit it 
2 5 THE COURT: Does thff defendant desire to address 
1 j defendant serve up to one year in the Box Elder County 
2 | jail. T note that he has already served 8 2 days. I 
3 ; do not require any specific additional time to be 
! 
! 
4 i served. As soon as he can be matriculated into an 
i 
i 
5 | inpatient treatment program, I'll allow him to enter 
6 ' that program. He must successfully complete the 
i 
7 j Drogram. If he flunks out of it and comes back before 
i 
8 j the court, his plea in abeyance agreement will then go 
j 
t 
9 j into effect in that he'll have a judgment on the plea. 
10 j So you have to complete the counseling program. 
i 
1 1 ; Once he completes that successfully, an 
12 ; alcohol counseling program, I will allow him to be 
13 : released and suspend the remaining balance of the jail 
i 
14 j time. 
j 
1 5 | I'll require that he pay a fine and 
i 
16 ] surcharge in the amount of S925. 
17 MR. BOUWHUIS: Excuse me. Would that be mor-
! 
18 j appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me — 
L 9 i well, that's fine. 
i 
20 i THE COURT: I'm not sure where you're going with 
21 j that• 
22 MR. BOUWHUIS: I'll withdraw that. 
23 j THE COURT: All right. As I indicated to him. he 
24 must complete the inpatient program successfully and 
25 any after care that is required for a year following 
he'll have to abide by all laws. You can't be 
convicted of any criminal offenses during probation. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You and Mr. Bouwhuis and your 
probation officer need to get busy and start to find 
out where you can get into a program. I want you to 
understand, Mr. Hunsaker, that I'm trying to design 
this to address the problem. If you flunk out, you 
could end up at the prison on this very charge. 
MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, Your Honor, I realize that. 
Can we — am I to pay this fine now or in the event I 
flunk out on my probation? 
THE COURT: You will owe the fine. If you can 
pay it now, I expect you to pay it. If you can't, you 
will have to pay it during the period of your 
proba t i on. 
That's all. Good luck to you. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank vou. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, : 
Defendant. : 
: MOTION, AGREEMENT, AND 
: ORDER FOR PLEA IN 
: ABEYANCE 
Case No. 6"[S[£££1H^ 
Come now the parties hereto, the State of Utah through its 
undersigned representative, and the defendant both personally and 
through his undersigned attorney, and jointly request the Court 
to accept a Plea in Abeyance in this matter, pursuant to the 
terms and conditions specified herein, and, further, agree to the 
terms and conditions specified herein regarding a Plea in 
Abeyance: 
1. The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to the 
following charge or charges: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, ON OR ABOUT 
DECEMBER 6, 1995. 
2. The Court shall accept the defendant's plea of guilty, 
but not enter judgment of conviction nor impose sentence, and all 
time periods otherwise imposed by applicable law regarding the 
time for entry of judgment or conviction against the defendant, 
and the time to impose sentence upon the defendant are hereby 
specifically waived. 
3. The defendant is represented by the undersigned attorney 
and has been during negotiations for the Plea in Abeyance. 
4. The plea entered shall be held in abeyance for a period 
of 3 6 months. 
5. The defendant specifically understands and agrees that 
if, at any time prior to the expiration of the term during which 
the plea is to be held in abeyance, the Court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or 
condition of the Judgment and Order entered in this matter, the 
Court may then terminate the agreement and enter judgment of 
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the 
offense to which the original plea was entered. 
6. Upon the Court finding that the defendant has 
successfully completed the terms and conditions of this Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement, the Court shall dismiss the charge of 
Aggravated Assault. 
7. The defendant shall be supervised by the Utah State 
Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Department, 
as if the defendant were on Probation. 
8. The special terms and conditions of this Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement, which shall be administered and supervised as 
if the defendant were on Probation, are to be as later imposed by 
the court following recommendations being received by the court 
from the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole. 
9. The parties understand and agree that the Court retains 
2 
jurisdiction to make such other and further orders, conditions, 
and terms as it deems necessary. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996. 
3QYD JBBNS^KBR 
^ 5 G^R^F / BARON 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
"-T4ICHAEL D. BOUWHUtS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
APPROVAL AND ORDER 
The Court, after reading and considering the above Motion 
and Agreement for Plea in Abeyance, and having fully considered 
the same, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby approves the 
above Agreement, grants the Motion of the parties to accept the 
Plea in Abeyance, and will enter its Order accordingly. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM C 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Post Office Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
Facsimile (801)366-0167 
Counsel for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, : Case No. 960234-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The State of Utah files this supplemental memorandum in response to this Court's 
Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition dated 17 April 1996. 
Judgment and Order. Since filing its memorandum on 24 April 1996, the State 
has learned that a Judgment and Order on Plea Held in Abeyance was entered in this case 
on 27 February 1996. A copy of this order was faxed to the Attorney General's Office on 
25 April 1996 by the Clerk of the First District Court and is annexed, with fax cover sheet, 
as exhibit A. No copy of this order was attached to the Docketing Statement, nor does 
the Notice of Appeal mention it. 
This order specifies the terms of the plea in abeyance. Paragraph 8 is of interest 
because it dilutes the requirement of jail time: "The defendant shall serve 1 year in the Box 
Elder County Jail with release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be arranged. The 
remainder of the jail sentence shall be suspended upon successfully completing the 
inpatient program." 
Analysis. The State argues in Point One of the State's original memorandum that 
this Court lacks jurisdiction because defendant is not appealing from a final order. The 
order attached as exhibit A does not alter this analysis. Although styled "Judgment and 
Order," this order is nevertheless not final for purposes of appeal. In criminal cases, "[i]t 
is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the right 
to appeal." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978); see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18a-1(1) (1995) (granting defendants a right of appeal from certain post-judgment 
orders and incompetency orders). Defendant has not been sentenced; therefore, no final 
order has been entered in this case. The appeal should be dismissed. 
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